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UPDATING TWENTIETH CENTURY WATER
PROJECTS TO MEET TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
NEEDS: LESSONS FROM THE TRI-STATE WATER
WARS
Lewis B. Jones, John L. Fortuna, Karen M. Johnston
INTRODUCTION
As populations grow and water supplies dwindle, communities
throughout the United States are looking for ways to fill the gap
between supply and demand. In many cases, the water resources exist
but are tied up in storage projects operated by the United States Army
Corps of Engineers, which operates 136 multipurpose projects
storing 9.8 million acre-feet of water (1.24 trillion gallons).1 As a
result of outdated authorizations, under-developed laws, and
dysfunctional politics, however, this water has all too often proved
incredibly difficult to access.
The “Tri-State Water Wars” among Alabama, Florida, and Georgia
are a case in point. Metropolitan Atlanta, with a population of over
five million people, lies in the Piedmont Region of North Georgia,
where groundwater is scarce and surface water is limited to small,
headwater streams with highly variable flows.2 As a result,
Metropolitan Atlanta depends heavily on storage reservoirs—and in
particular on two large Corps projects known as Lake Lanier and
Allatoona Lake, which together provide over ninety percent of its
water supply.3 No practical alternatives to these reservoirs exist, and
1. Benedykt Dziegielewski & Jack C. Kiefer, U.S. Army Corp of Eng’rs, Water Resources Outlook
8 (2006), available at http://www.iwr.usace.army.mil/Portals/70/docs/iwrreports/2007-R-03.pdf.
2. Metro. N. Ga. Water Planning Dist., Water Supply and Water Conservation Management Plan
1–13 (2009), available at http://documents.northgeorgiawater.org/Water_Supply_Water_Conservation_
Plan_May2009.pdf (explaining that Atlanta developed in the headwaters of six different river basins);
id. at 2-5 (“Groundwater sources make up less than one percent of the total available water supply in the
Metro Water District due to bedrock geology.”).
3. Id. at 2-1 (explaining that the Chattahoochee River system, which includes Lake Lanier, is the
“most significant water supply source for the region,” alone accounting “for approximately 73 percent
of the permitted available water supply in the Metro Water District”); id. at 2-2 tbl.2-1 (showing
proportion of withdrawals made available by Lake Lanier and Allatoona Lake, respectively).

959

Published by Reading Room, 2013

1

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 3

960

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:4

the entire Metropolitan Atlanta region has developed in reliance upon
them.4 Yet Atlanta has had to fight for over twenty years to establish
its right to continue its existing use of these waters, let alone to
secure adequate supplies to accommodate future growth.5 Indeed,
Atlanta’s right to utilize these Corps projects was not established
until 2012, when the issue was firmly and finally decided by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in In re TriState Water Rights Litigation, and the Supreme Court denied further
review.6
The Tri-State decision has implications for many other federal
projects. Lake Lanier, which was the focal point of the Tri-State case,
is like many other Corps projects in that it was authorized in the
1940s to serve a mix of purposes that may no longer be relevant. As
in the case of many other projects, the region served by Lake Lanier
has changed dramatically since Congress authorized the project.
When Lake Lanier was authorized, the population of the entire
Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF) River Basin was just 1.6
million,7 rural electrification was still a priority throughout the
South,8 transportation networks were under-developed, and
4. Id. at ES-9 (explaining that “Lake Lanier and Allatoona Lake have played a key role in assuring
an adequate water supply for the Metro Water District since their construction by the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers (Corps) in the 1950s” and that “[a]fter reviewing alternatives to the use of the federal
reservoirs, the Water District has concluded that there are no alternatives to the Chattahoochee River
and the Etowah River as major water supply sources for north Georgia.”).
5. See In re Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 639 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (M.D. Fla. 2009),
rev’d and vacated sub nom. In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir.
2011) (per curiam), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 25 (2012); see also Shaila Dewan, River Basin Fight Pits
Atlanta Against Neighbors, N.Y. Times (Aug. 15, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/16/us/
16water.html; Judge Rules Against Atlanta Regional Water Wars, USA Today (July 17, 2009, 3:34
PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-07-17-lake-lanier_N.htm; Water Wars in the
South-east: Chattahoochee Blues, Economist (Sept. 16, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/
17043462.
6. In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160,1205 (11th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 25 (2012).
7. H.R. Doc. No. 80-300, at 17 (1947) (survey report discussing the plan of improvement for the
ACF River Basin and the development of Lake Lanier, which is incorporated into the River and Harbor
Act of 1946).
8. Significant legislation was enacted in furtherance of this goal, such as the Rural Electrification
Act of 1936, 7 U.S.C. §§ 901–918(c) (2006), and the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 16
U.S.C. §§ 831–831ee (2006). Rural electrification also played a prominent role in the authorization
hearings concerning Lake Lanier. See, e.g., Rivers and Harbors Bill: Hearings Before the Comm. on
Rivers and Harbors H.R. Seventy-Ninth Cong. Second Sess. on H.R. 6407 a Bill Authorizing the
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environmental protection was hardly a consideration.9 Today, five
million people reside in metropolitan Atlanta alone,10 water is scarce,
the region is fully electrified and connected by highway and rail, and
a host of environmental issues have risen to the fore. In short,
priorities have changed.
Unfortunately, the prevailing wisdom—in this controversy and
others—has been that an Act of Congress may be required to modify
existing projects to serve modern needs.11 The authors argue,
however, that the need for Congressional action has been greatly
overstated: The Tri-State decision makes clear that older
authorizations, when properly understood and interpreted in their
historical context, may provide significantly more authority to
modify existing projects than has been previously believed.
This paper will proceed in five basic parts. Part I provides a brief
discussion of the legal framework governing the authorization and
modification of Corps projects.12 Part II provides a brief overview of
Construction, Repair and Preservation of Certain Public Works on Rivers and Harbors, and for Other
Purposes, 79th Cong. 249, 251 (1946) (statement of Rep. John E. Rankin, Member H. Comm. on Rivers
and Harbors) (noting that there are 250,000 farms in Georgia and that electrification would “double the
value of every farm it touches”).
9. The Gulf sturgeon is a case in point. No one considered the fact that construction of the large
dams authorized by Congress would block its migration to historic spawning grounds in the
Chattahoochee River. And at the same time, the City of Apalachicola, Florida was the center of a
significant Gulf sturgeon fishery that severely depleted the species. The sturgeon is slowly coming back,
since the fishery was closed in the 1990s, but it is still listed as a threatened species and managed under
the Endangered Species Act. See The Gulf Sturgeon Recovery/Mgmt. Task Team, Gulf Sturgeon
Recovery/Management Plan 22–24 (1995), available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/recovery/
sturgeon_gulf.pdf.
10. U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2012, at 26–28 tbl.20 (2012),
available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0020.pdf.
11. See, e.g., C. Grady Moore, Water Wars: Interstate Water Allocation in the Southeast, 14 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV’T. 5, 9 (1999) (discussing Alabama’s position in interstate compact negotiations
with Georgia that projects must be strictly operated to provide the levels of navigation support
envisioned in the authorizing reports, even though major projects needed to support these flows were
never constructed and notwithstanding the fact that these operations are outdated and inefficient);
George William Sherk, The Management of Interstate Water Conflicts in the Twenty-First Century: Is It
Time to Call Uncle?, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 764, 771 n.21, 781 (2005) (opining that flood control and
hydropower are the only two authorized purposes of the project and that “Lake Lanier was not
authorized by Congress to be a water supply reservoir,” and broadly suggesting that congressional
action is needed). This is, of course, also the position of Alabama, Florida, and the other parties
challenging the Corps’ water supply authority at Lake Lanier, as well as the position adopted by the
district court.
12. See infra Part I.
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the Tri-State litigation and the dispute surrounding the Corps’
authority to operate Lake Lanier to accommodate Atlanta’s growing
water supply needs.13 Parts III and IV discuss the basic flaw in the
Corps’ interpretation of the authorizing legislation for Lake Lanier,
with a focus on the intervening policy developments and
authorization and funding procedures that caused the Corps and the
district court to underestimate the Corps’ authority to modify project
operations to meet Atlanta’s needs.14 Finally, Part V discusses what
role, if any, post-authorization legislative history and appropriations
legislation should play in interpreting authorizing legislation.15
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING AUTHORIZATION AND
MODIFICATION OF CORPS PROJECTS
The Corps enjoys broad discretion to operate water projects under
its control. The general understanding is that Congress identifies the
purposes to be served by a project while leaving it to the Corps to
determine how to balance competing objectives.16 Because there is
very little statutory law on point, however, and because individual
project authorizations vary widely, it is not always easy to identify
the authorized purposes for any given project. The Corps’ own
analysis of the “authorized purposes” for each of its projects is set
forth in a table published the Code of Federal Regulations at 33
C.F.R. § 222.5, Appendix E.17
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part III and Part IV.
15. See infra Part V.
16. In South Dakota v. Ubbelohde, for example, the Eighth Circuit rejected an argument by the
Corps that a challenge to the operation of its Missouri River projects should be dismissed because there
was no law to apply. See 330 F.3d 1014, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003). The court explained that the Corps’
discretion is not entirely unconstrained because the authorizing legislation “lays out purposes that the
Corps is to consider in managing the River.” Id. The Court thus held that it could review the Corps’
operating decisions “to ensure that it considered each of these interests before making a decision.” Id.
The court also acknowledged, however, that its function was very limited because the applicable law
“does not provide . . . a method of deciding whether the balance actually struck by the Corps in a given
case is correct or not.” Id.
17. See also U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Authorized and Operating Purposes of Corps of Engineers
Reservoirs 2 (1992, rev. 1994), available at http://corpslakes.usace.army.mil/employees/pdfs/94ropreservoir.pdf. This report was prepared and submitted to Congress to comply with Section 311 of the
Water Resources Development Act of 1990, which directed the Secretary to identify the authorized and
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Project authorities can be divided into two basic groups—specific
authorities and general authorities. Specific authorities are contained
in the initial authorization for a project and in any subsequent
legislation that modifies the original authorizing legislation.18
Specific authorities often include purposes such as navigation, flood
control, hydropower, water supply, and recreation.19
Congress has authorized other purposes through general legislation
applicable to all Corps projects or to all projects constructed after a
given date.20 Examples of these general authorities include authority
provided by the Flood Control Act of 1944 to sell “surplus water”
and to construct and operate recreational facilities;21 authority
provided by the Water Supply Act of 1958 to include storage for
municipal and industrial water supply;22 authority provided by the
Clean Water Act to augment low flows to benefit water quality;23
authority provided by the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act to
modify projects to conserve fish and wildlife;24 and authority
provided by the Endangered Species Act to address the needs of
endangered and threatened species.25 The limitations applicable to
these authorities vary by statute.
In addition, the Army has some inherent authority to make minor
modifications to the plans approved by Congress. In some cases the
authority to modify a plan is explicitly provided in the authorizing
operating purposes for each of its projects. Water Resources Development Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-640, 104 Stat. 4604 (codified in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.).
18. See U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, supra note 17, at 1, 2.
19. Id. at 1–3.
20. Id. at 2.
21. Flood Control Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-534, 58 Stat. 887 (1944) (codified in scattered
sections of 16, 33 & 43 U.S.C.). For recreation, see also the Federal Water Project Recreation Act of
1965, 16 U.S.C. § 460l-12 to -21 (2006). That act declared it Congress’s intent that recreation and fish
and wildlife enhancement be given full consideration as project purposes provided non-Federal bodies
agree to certain cost-sharing requirements. Id.
22. Water Supply Act of 1958, 43 U.S.C. § 390b (2006).
23. 33 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (mandating that consideration be given at all projects “to inclusion of
storage for regulation of streamflow, except that any such storage and water releases shall not be
provided as a substitute for adequate treatment or other methods of controlling waste at the source”).
24. 16 U.S.C. § 662(c).
25. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (authorizing all federal agencies to “utilize their authorities in furtherance of
the purposes of [the Act] by carrying out programs for the conservation of endangered species and
threatened species”).
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legislation,26 but this is the exception and not the rule.27 Even when
the authorizing legislation is silent, it is generally accepted that the
Army has discretion to modify the specific plans authorized by
Congress without further legislation so long as the modification is not
“so foreign to the original purpose as to be arbitrary or capricious.”28
This general understanding is reflected in an internal guidance
document (called an “Engineering Regulation”) addressing the
Army’s authority to modify completed projects.29 The Engineering
Regulation states that “significant modifications” require
Congressional authorization.30 It indicates that modifications should
be deemed “significant” if they would “serve new purposes” or
“extend services to new beneficiaries (areas).”31 It provides little
guidance, however, to assist in determining whether a given purpose
should be considered “new,” as this is a question of statutory
interpretation that can only be determined by examining the specific
history of each project.

26. For example, the Water Resources Development Act of 1986 authorized numerous projects
“with such modifications as are recommended by the Chief of Engineers and approved by the Secretary,
and with such other modifications as are recommended by the Secretary.” Water Resources
Development Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-662, 100 Stat. 4082 (codified in scattered sections of Titles
16, 26, 33 & 42).
27. It is much more common for the Chief of Engineers to request such authority in the report
submitted to Congress. For example, the report recommending authorization of the Benbrook Dam in
Tarrant County, Texas includes a recommendation that the project be approved “with such future
modifications thereof as in the discretion of the Secretary of War and the Chief of Engineers may be
advisable.” United States v. 2,606.84 Acres of Land, 432 F.2d 1286, 1292 (5th Cir. 1970) (quoting H.R.
Doc. No. 77-403, at 7). When Congress then authorized the project to be constructed in accordance with
the Chief of Engineers’ report, the Fifth Circuit held that Congress had, in effect, granted the Chief of
Engineers’ request, thus providing substantial authority for the Army to deviate from the specific plans
authorized by Congress. Id.
28. See Creppel v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 670 F.2d 564, 572 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Britt v.
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 769 F.2d 84, 89 (2d Cir. 1985); United States ex rel. Chapman v. Fed.
Power Comm’n, 191 F.2d 796, 806 (4th Cir. 1951), aff’d, 345 U.S. 153 (1953); Ryan v. Chi., B. & Q. R.
Co., 59 F.2d 137, 142 (7th Cir. 1932).
29. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Engineering Regulation No. 1165-2-119 ¶ 1 (1982), available at
http://publications.usace.army.mil/publications/eng-regs/ER_1165-2-119/ER_1165-2-119.pdf. Although
called a “regulation,” this document is more properly considered “guidance” because it was not
promulgated in accordance with the procedures required by the Administrative Procedure Act.
30. Id. ¶ 5.
31. Id.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol29/iss4/3

6

Jones et al.: Updating Twentieth Century Water Projects to Meet Twenty-First Ce

2013]

LESSONS FROM THE TRI-STATE WATER WARS

965

II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TRI-STATE WATER RIGHTS LITIGATION32
Georgia, Alabama, and Florida have been litigating over the
Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF) River Basin and the
Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa (ACT) River Basin for almost a quarter
century.33 The main point in controversy is the scope of the Corps’
authority to use two federal reservoirs—Lake Lanier and Allatoona
Lake—to provide drinking water to communities in Metropolitan
Atlanta.34 As framed in the litigation, two basic questions were
presented: first, whether water supply is a specifically “authorized
purpose” of these projects; and second, whether the Corps’ water
supply operations exceed its supplemental authority under the Water
Supply Act of 1958.35
The litigation commenced in 1990 when the Corps released a draft
plan to reallocate storage in both Lake Lanier (in the ACF) and
Allatoona Lake (in the ACT), and to execute contracts with water
supply providers in North Georgia that would assure their access to
water stored in the projects into the future.36 Alabama filed suit in the
32. Here, we provide only a brief history and sufficient facts to place the dispute over Lake Lanier’s
so-called “authorized purposes” in context. For a more complete history of this controversy, see, for
example, Robert Haskell Abrams, Settlement of the ACF Controversy: Sisyphus at the Dawn of the 21st
Century, 31 HAMLINE L. REV. 679 (2008).
33. In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160, 1165 (11th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 25 (2012).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1165–66.
36. See id. at 1173 (citing Army Corps of Eng’rs, Post-Authorization Change Notification Report
(1989)). The Army Corps’ draft plan was thought to be the final step in a long-term partnership with the
Corps to meet Atlanta’s water needs. After nearly a decade of joint study by federal, state, and local
agencies, including the Corps and the city of Atlanta, Congress authorized the construction of a
“reregulating dam for water supply purposes” on the Chattahoochee River below Lake Lanier. See
Water Resources Development Act of 1986, § 601(a), Pub. L. No. 99–662, 100 Stat. 4082 (codified in
scattered sections of 16, 26, 33 & 42 U.S.C.). This reregulation dam was intended to capture peaking
hydropower releases from Lake Lanier and attenuate the flow to make water available for withdrawal by
Atlanta downstream. Indeed, the explicit purpose of the plan authorized by Congress was to increase
water supply for Metropolitan Atlanta. South Atlantic Division, Army Corps of Engineers, Comments
on Draft Post Authorization Change Report for Lake Lanier Reallocation at ¶ 1 (Dec. 5, 1989) (on file
with author).
Following an environmental study required by the National Environmental Policy Act, the Corps
concluded that it would be preferable to reallocate storage in Lake Lanier to water supply permanently
rather than to build the reregulation dam authorized by Congress. To that end, the Corps prepared the
Draft Post Authorization Change Report, which proposed to reallocate 207,000 acre-feet of storage in
Lake Lanier to water supply. Id.
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Northern District of Alabama to enjoin the Corps from finalizing or
implementing the draft plan.37 This litigation was stayed several
months later to give the states and the Corps time to negotiate. The
stay remained in effect and led to the formation of two interstate
compacts—one for each basin—in 1997.38
The two compacts established a governing structure but did not
include a formula for allocating water among the states.39 In essence,
they were “agreement[s] to agree” on an allocation formula, which
the signatories anticipated would be negotiated within one year.40
This did not occur, however, and (after several extensions) the ACF
and ACT Compacts terminated in 2003 and 2004, respectively.41
While the compact allocation negotiations were still pending, the
State of Georgia submitted a “water supply request” to the Corps.42
In this request, Georgia asked the Corps to reallocate storage in Lake
Lanier in an amount sufficient to accommodate withdrawals (either
directly from Lake Lanier or from the Chattahoochee River below the
project) in the amount of 705 million gallons per day.43
37. See Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 424 F.3d 1117, 1122–23 (11th Cir. 2005). Several
aspects of Alabama’s original suit are notable. First, it was commenced before the draft Post
Authorization Change Report was finalized and before the proposed contracts were executed. See id.
The suit was thus clearly unripe at the time it was filed. Second, the suit alleged only violations of the
National Environmental Policy Act. Id. at 1123. The notion that the draft plan exceeded the Corps’
authority did not creep into the litigation until much later.
38. See Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 105-104, 111 Stat.
2219 (1997) (ACF Compact); Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 105-105,
111 Stat. 2233 (1997) (ACT Compact).
39. See ACF Compact art. VII(a) (stating that it was “the intent of the parties to this Compact to
develop an allocation formula for equitably apportioning the surface waters of the ACF Basin among the
states,” that “[w]hen an allocation formula [was] unanimously approved by the State Commissioners,
there shall be an agreement among the states regarding an allocation formula,” and that “[t]he allocation
formula thus agreed upon shall become effective and binding upon the parties to this Compact” upon
concurrence by the Federal Commissioner); ACT Compact art. VII(a) (same).
40. See, e.g., Benjamin L. Snowden, Bargaining in the Shadow of Uncertainty: Understanding the
Failure of the ACF and ACT Compacts, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 134, 146 (2005) (explaining that “the
drafters of the ACF and ACT compacts . . . ’punted’ on the most important issue: the actual allocation of
the waters”); Andrew Thornley, A Tale of Two River Basins: The Southeast Finds Itself in a Rare
Interstate Water Struggle, 9 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 97, 102 (2005) (pointing out that the “compacts
contained no allocation formula, which is noteworthy ‘since most water compacts allocate water’”).
41. Joseph F. Zimmerman, Interstate Disputes: The Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction 170–71
(2006).
42. See Letter from Roy E. Barnes, Governor of Ga., to Honorable Joseph W. Westphal, Asst. Sec’y
of the Army for Civil Works (May 16, 2000) (on file with author).
43. In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160, 1176 (11th Cir. 2011) (per
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The Corps denied Georgia’s water supply request on grounds that
it could not “be accommodated without additional Congressional
authorization.”44 The legal memorandum accompanying the denial
explained that water supply was not an “authorized purpose” of Lake
Lanier under the River and Harbor Act of 1946, which was the
original legislation authorizing construction of the project.45 The
Corps recognized that the River and Harbor Act of 1946 did not itself
say anything about the authorized purposes of Lake Lanier; instead,
the Act merely directed that the project be constructed “in accordance
with” certain engineering reports and project documents prepared by
the Corps, which were incorporated into statute.46 The Corps found,
however, that those engineering reports and project documents
identified only three congressionally authorized purposes:
hydropower, flood control, and navigation.47 Water supply, according
to the Corps, was intended as merely an “incidental benefit” of
releases for the other authorized purposes.48
Having concluded that water supply was not an authorized
purpose, the Corps then analyzed whether it could grant Georgia’s
request under the supplemental authority provided by the Water

curiam), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 25 (2012) (explaining that “the State of Georgia submitted a formal
request to the Corps to modify its operation of the Buford Project in order to meet the Georgia Parties’
water supply needs through 2030. The request was to withdraw 408 mgd from the river and 297 mgd
directly from the lake”); Letter from Roy E. Barnes, supra note 42 at 1.
44. See Letter from R. L. Brownlee, Acting Assistant Sec’y of the Army for Civil Works, to Roy E.
Barnes, Governor of Ga. (Apr. 15, 2002) (on file with author).
45. See Memorandum from Earl Stockdale, Deputy General Counsel, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs
(Civil Works & Env’t), to Acting Assistant Sec’y of the Army 2, 3–8 (Apr. 15, 2002) [hereinafter
Stockdale Memorandum] (on file with the Georgia State University Law Review).
46. Id. at 4. As it relates to Lake Lanier, the sole reference to the ACF River Basin in the Act is
found in the list of sixty “works of improvement,” as follows:
Apalachicola, Chattahoochee and Flint Rivers, Georgia and Florida; in accordance with
the report of the Chief of Engineers, dated May 13, 1946: Provided, That the proposed
dam referred to in such report as Junction Dam shall, upon its completion, be known and
designated on the public records as the Jim Woodruff Dam[.]
River and Harbor Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-525 § 1, 60 Stat. 634.
47. Stockdale Memorandum, supra note 45, at 4.
48. Id. at 4 (reasoning that the project documents indicate “that navigation, hydropower and flood
control were the specifically authorized purposes—those purposes which render the project
economically feasible and which govern the operation of the reservoir. On the other hand, water supply
was clearly one of the project’s incidental benefits—those benefits that accrue to the project as a
byproduct of its operation for its specifically authorized purposes”).
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Supply Act of 1958.49 The Corps concluded that it could not because
the request would result in a “major operational change” and
“seriously affect” the other authorized purposes of the project.50
Georgia and the Georgia Water Supply Providers filed suit in the
Northern District of Georgia to challenge the Corps’ denial of
Georgia’s water supply request.51 They were hardly the only parties
to file suit to challenge the Corps’ actions in the ACF River Basin,
however, and litigation proliferated following the collapse of the
Compacts. At one time there were no fewer than eight different
district court cases pending in federal courts in Georgia, Florida,
Alabama, and the District of Columbia.52 The various cases were
ultimately consolidated in a multidistrict litigation proceeding in
2007, transferring claims involving the ACF River Basin to the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Florida while claims
involving the ACT River Basin remaining in the U.S. District Court
49. Id. at 7–12.
50. Id.; see also 43 U.S.C. § 390b(d) (2006). As relevant here, the Water Supply Act of 1958
imposes two limits the Corps’ discretion to modify projects to include water supply without seeking
additional congressional authorization:
Modifications of a reservoir project heretofore authorized, surveyed, planned, or
constructed to include storage as provided in subsection (b) of this section which would
seriously affect the purposes for which the project was authorized, surveyed, planned, or
constructed, or which would involve major structural or operational changes shall be
made only upon the approval of Congress as now provided by law.
Id.
51. Georgia v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 223 F.R.D. 691, 693 (N.D. Ga. 2004), aff’d, 144 F.
App’x 850 (11th Cir. 2005).
52. These included the original suit by Alabama that precipitated the tri-state legal battle (which was
bifurcated by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation into separate proceedings in federal courts in
Florida and Alabama), the suit by Georgia and the Georgia Water Supply Providers challenging the
Corps’ denial of Georgia’s water supply request, a suit by hydropower customers who purchase power
from the Corps alleging that water supply withdrawals impacted hydropower production, suits by the
State of Florida and the City of Apalachicola, Florida challenging the Corps’ compliance with the
Endangered Species Act and other statutes, a suit by the City of Columbus, Georgia seeking to ensure
flows in the Chattahoochee River sufficient for wastewater dilution, and a second suit by Georgia and
the Water Supply Providers challenging an interim operating rule adopted by the Corps to address
Florida’s Endangered Species Act claims. See In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d
1160, 1165 n.2 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 25, (2012) (“The four underlying
cases are Alabama v. United States Army Corps of Engineers; Southeastern Federal Power Customers,
Inc. v. Caldera; Georgia v. United States Army Corps of Engineers; and City of Apalachicola v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers.”); Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 424 F.3d 1117, 1121 (11th
Cir. 2005) (noting there were “are two ancillary proceedings which are relevant to these appeals,”
Southeastern Federal Power Customers, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 00–CV–2975
(D.D.C.) and Georgia v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2:01–CV–00026–RWS (N.D. Ga.)).
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for the Northern District of Alabama.53 The ACF litigation was
further bifurcated to separate claims involving the Corps’ authority to
operate Lake Lanier to meet Atlanta’s water supply needs from other
claims involving the Endangered Species Act, the National
Environmental Policy Act, and other statutes.54
Against this backdrop, the scope of the Corps’ authority to operate
Lake Lanier to meet Atlanta’s water supply needs was presented to
the district court in two separate but related ways. On the one hand,
Alabama, Florida, and others presented the district court with claims
that Atlanta’s existing water use exceeded the Corps’ legal
authority.55 On the other hand, the district court reviewed claims by
Georgia and the Georgia Water Supply Providers that the Corps erred
in concluding it lacked the authority to grant Georgia’s water supply
request, which was intended to facilitate expanded withdrawals
necessary to meet future water supply needs.56
In 2009, the district court issued a summary judgment order and
injunction in favor of Alabama, Florida and the other plaintiffs
challenging the Corps’ authority to meet Atlanta’s water supply
needs.57 The district court decision included three basic parts. First,
the district court affirmed the Corps’ denial of Georgia’s water
supply request, including the determination that water supply is not
an authorized purpose of Lake Lanier.58 It did so based on many of
the same factors identified by the Corps in the Stockdale
Memorandum, as well as evidence and “legislative history” that postdated the authorization of the project in 1946.59 Second, the district
court found that Georgia’s water supply request would exceed the
53. See In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d at 1176–77; In re Tri-State Water
Rights Litig., 481 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1353 (J.P.M.L. 2007).
54. See Third Amended Joint Scheduling Order, No. 3:07-md-00001 (Nov. 7, 2008) (discussing
bifurcation of proceeding).
55. In re Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 639 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1347 (M.D. Fla. 2009), rev’d and
vacated sub nom. In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 25 (2012).
56. Id. at 1352–54 (addressing Georgia’s claim).
57. Id. at 1356.
58. See id. at 1347 (coming to what it termed “the inescapable conclusion that water supply, at least
in the form of withdrawals from Lake Lanier, is not an authorized purpose of the Buford project”).
59. Id.
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Corps’ authority under the Water Supply Act of 1958 because it
would result in a “major operational change” and would “seriously
affect” the authorized purposes of the project.60 Third, the district
court held that, for the same reasons, even Atlanta’s existing water
supply uses exceeded the Corps’ authority.61 Based on these three
conclusions, the district court entered an injunction, which the court
itself called “draconian,” giving Metropolitan Atlanta just three years
to find an alternative water supply, after which time the taps and
toilets of some 3.5 million to 4 million people would run dry.62
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
reversed and vacated the district court’s ruling in June 2011.63 The
Eleventh Circuit found that the district court lacked jurisdiction to
consider the various claims by Alabama, Florida and others
challenging Atlanta’s existing water supply withdrawals, finding that
the suits failed to identify any final agency action subject to review
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).64 Insofar as
Alabama, Florida and others challenged the Corps’ operations to
meet Atlanta’s current water supply needs, the court explained that
the Corps had not reached any final decision concerning its water
supply operations at Lake Lanier.65 The court also concluded that—
despite the fact that the dispute over Lake Lanier’s operation had
been ongoing for more than two decades—the Corps’ failure to take
final agency action was reasonable under the circumstances,
explaining that the Corps had been prevented from taking final action
through a combination of court injunctions, voluntary stays to
facilitate negotiations among the states, and the ACF Compact.66 The
court accordingly vacated the district court’s self-described
“draconian” injunction, allowing metropolitan Atlanta’s water supply

60. See id. at 1347–54.
61. See In re Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 639 F. Supp. 2d at 1352–54.
62. See id. at 1355.
63. See In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160, 1205 (11th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 25 (2012).
64. See id. at 1181–85.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 1182–84.
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withdrawals to continue until the Corps reaches a final decision on its
water supply operations.
The court did, however, have jurisdiction to review the Corps’
denial of Georgia’s water supply request, which was undoubtedly
final agency action under the APA. And on this point, the Eleventh
Circuit also reversed.67 Contrary to the opinion of both the Corps and
the district court, the Eleventh Circuit held that water supply is, and
always has been, a fully authorized purpose of Lake Lanier.68 The
Court explained that the project documents incorporated into the
River and Harbor Act of 1946 “clearly indicate[] that Congress
intended for water supply to be an authorized, rather than incidental,
use of the water stored in Lake Lanier,”69 and that the “language of
the [River and Harbor Act of 1946] clearly indicates that water
supply was an authorized purpose of the Buford Project” and Lake
Lanier.70 The Court explained that Congress intended for project
operations to change to meet Atlanta’s growing water supply needs
when it authorized the project in 1946, and that Congress understood
that any marginal impact to hydropower production would be more
than outweighed by providing Atlanta an assured water supply
source.71 The Eleventh Circuit accordingly remanded the case to the
Corps to reconsider Georgia’s water supply request in light of this
clarified legal authority.72
Following the Eleventh Circuit’s remand, the Corps issued a legal
opinion in June 2012 concluding that it has sufficient authority to
grant Georgia’s water supply request but that it must prepare an
environmental impact statement (EIS) before deciding whether or not
to do so.73 The Corps is now in the process of preparing the EIS.74
67. See id. at 1192–97.
68. See id. at 1187–92.
69. In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d at 1188–89.
70. Id. at 1192.
71. Id. at 1188.
72. Id. at 1200–01.
73. Memorandum from Earl H. Stockdale, Chief Counsel, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, to the Chief
of Engineers (June 25, 2012), available at www.sam.usace.army.mil/Portals/46/docs/planning_
environmental/acf/docs/2012ACF_legalopinion.pdf.
74. See Notice of Intent To Revise Scope of Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Updating the
Water Control Manual for the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin, 77 Fed. Reg. 62224-01–
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A. An Anachronistic Analysis: Viewing Project Authorizations
Through The Lens Of Modern Policy
Given that the Eleventh Circuit, the district court, and the Corps all
reached such starkly different conclusions, it is fair to ask how and
why their analyses diverged. The answer, we suggest, is two-fold.
First, the district court focused largely on documents and
congressional testimony developed long after the legislation
authorizing Lake Lanier was enacted, giving only scant attention to
the actual authorizing legislation that the Eleventh Circuit found
controlling.75 Second, and perhaps more fundamentally, the Corps
(and to a certain degree the district court) viewed the authorizing
legislation and incorporated reports through a distorted lens, reading
the authorizing documents as if they had been written today, in
accordance with modern principles and guidelines that did not exist
at the time. As explained more fully below, the modern guidelines
make it easy to identify a discrete set of “authorized purposes” for
each project. These modern guidelines were not developed until later,
however, and the result of viewing project documents from the 1940s
through this anachronistic lens is to distort them. The Eleventh
Circuit, in contrast, was able to read the historical documents on their
own terms. When this is done, the documents reveal quite clearly—in
terms appropriate to the era—that water supply was among the
primary purposes of Lake Lanier.
When the Corps denied Georgia’s Water Supply Request in 2000,
it did so based on its interpretation of the Chief of Engineers’ report
referenced in the River and Harbor Act of 1946, which it erroneously
viewed as establishing that water supply was not an “authorized
purpose” of Lake Lanier.76 As the outcome of this litigation
demonstrates, the legal determination as to whether a purpose is or is
not an “authorized purpose” is extremely important, as it marks the
difference between a request the Corps cannot grant without
02 (Oct. 12, 2012).
75. For a discussion on this analytical error, see infra Part V.
76. See supra note 45–46 and accompanying text (discussing the Corps’ rationale, as set forth in the
Stockdale Memorandum).
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additional Congressional authorization and one the Corps has almost
unlimited discretion to accommodate. The litigation also shows,
however, that the legal framework for this analysis is not at all clear.
The first difficulty lies in the fact that the legislation authorizing a
project rarely enumerates “authorized purposes” as such. Instead, the
legislation typically authorizes a project to be constructed in
accordance with a report submitted by the Chief of Engineers without
further discussion.77 For example, Buford Dam and Lake Lanier were
authorized by the River and Harbor Act of 1946,78 but as noted
above, that legislation merely “adopted and authorized” a long list of
sixty projects, including Buford Dam, to be “prosecuted under the
direction of the Secretary of War and supervision of the Chief of
Engineers, in accordance with the plans and subject to the conditions
recommended by the Chief of Engineers in the respective reports
hereinafter designated . . . .”79
Ordinary tools of statutory interpretation are not much help with
statutes like these. The traditional canons can be applied to the
reports referenced in the statute, which are generally treated as if they
were incorporated into the text of the legislation itself,80 but this can
be problematic for several reasons. First, because the Chief of
Engineers’ reports are written with a view to the initial proposed
construction, they rarely have much, if anything, to say about
potential future modifications. Second, the reports are not written by
lawyers and are not generally intended to serve as legal documents.
Instead, they tend to provide a broad, narrative description of the
many potential benefits that a proposed project might bring and often
include conflicting views about the benefits of one plan or another. It
can be difficult, therefore, to parse them in the way one would parse
77. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, supra note 17, at 2 (explaining that the authorized purposes of
Corps projects “are not identified directly in the authorizing law but instead are contained in reports of
the Secretary of the Army, Chief of Engineers, Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors, or others
referred to in the law”).
78. Pub. L. No. 79-525, 60 Stat. 634 (1946).
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., Anderson v. Seeman, 252 F.2d 321, 325 (5th Cir. 1958) (determining the
congressionally authorized purposes of a project under the 1945 River and Harbor Act according to the
Corps reports incorporated by reference into that statute); see also U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, supra
note 17 at 2.
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a statute or a contract to determine what was actually recommended
for authorization. Third, because the reports also tend to be long and
detailed, it can be difficult to identify those features of the project
that Congress would have deemed material to, and thus a condition
of, the authorization. Fourth, the project documents authored by the
Corps are a product of their time; they are written in accordance with
the Corps’ policies and procedures that have evolved over time, and
yet the Corps seems to have lost sight of these changes—and thus
persists in reading survey reports from the previous era as if they had
been written today.
While each of these problems played a role in the litigation over
Lake Lanier, the fourth lies at the very heart of the Tri-State case. In
the case of Lake Lanier, the Corps made a critical mistake by
assuming that the Chief of Engineers’ report was written in
accordance with modern policies and guidelines that make it easy to
identify authorized purposes. According to the Corps, the authorized
purposes of a project should be ascertained by looking only to “those
purposes which render the project economically feasible and which
govern the operation of the reservoir.”81 In this regard, the Corps
placed special emphasis on three aspects of the Chief of Engineers’
report: (1) the fact that water supply was not explicitly identified as
an “authorized purpose” in the Chief of Engineers’ report; (2) the fact
that the benefit–cost analysis did not attribute any benefits to water
supply; and (3) the fact that no storage was explicitly allocated to
water supply.82 Modern guidelines require this type of breakdown
whenever water supply (or any other purpose) is proposed to be
included as a project purpose.83 Its omission in the Chief of
Engineers’ Report for Lake Lanier led the Corps to conclude that
water supply was not an authorized purpose of that project.84
The Corps’ error lay in the fact that it viewed Lake Lanier’s
authorization through the lens of its modern policies and guidelines
that were not adopted until after 1946, when Lake Lanier was
81.
82.
83.
84.

Stockdale Memorandum, supra note 45, at 4.
See id. at 7.
See, e.g., id., at 2.
Id. at 12.
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authorized.85 The phrase “authorized purpose” was not a term of art
in the 1940s, and it had no particular legal significance.86 Moreover,
a specific breakdown of the costs and benefits attributable to each
authorized purpose was simply not required at the time of Lake
Lanier’s authorization.87 And finally, there was no requirement that
the Corps specifically allocate storage to each of the authorized
purposes.88 In short, all of the reasons the Corps offered to conclude
water supply was not an authorized purpose of Lake Lanier were
based on policies that did not exist at the time the project was
authorized.
III. THE HISTORY THE CORPS FORGOT: POLICY DEVELOPMENTS
GOVERNING THE AUTHORIZATION OF WATER PROJECTS
The fundamental flaw in the Corps’ approach to Lake Lanier was
to assume that uniform policies of the type that exist today also
existed when that project was authorized. If such uniform policies
existed at the time when Lake Lanier was authorized, they might
provide evidence of background understandings shared by Congress,
but they did not. To the contrary, the struggle to develop a coherent
national water policy had barely begun.89 Indeed, the Corps was not
authorized to undertake multipurpose water projects until 1936,90 and
it took decades even to agree on the federal objectives for developing
such projects.91

85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See Stockdale Memorandum, supra note 45, at 12.
88. See id. at 7, 12.
89. See generally Arthur Maass, Muddy Waters: The Army Engineers and the Nation’s Rivers
(1951) (reviewing current policies and practices, describing attempts to establish a uniform national
water policy, and making specific recommendations).
90. Flood Control Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-738, § 5, 49 Stat. 1570, 1572 (codified at 33 U.S.C.
§ 701a–f). It went on to authorize a host of water resources projects, and directed that any projects
constructed include facilities for future development of hydroelectric power. See id.; Joseph L. Arnold,
The Evolution of the 1936 Flood Control Act 73, 97 (1988).
91. Arnold, supra note 90, at 92–93. The statute has been described as “a good example of
congressional legislation that is fairly clear in its general goals, but confusing and even irrational in its
specific policies and administrative machinery.” Id. at iii.
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The situation as of 1944—just two years before Lake Lanier was
authorized—is illustrated by the controversy over the development of
the Missouri River Basin in the 1940s. The Bureau of Reclamation
and the Army Corps of Engineers developed competing plans for the
Missouri River Basin—the “Sloan Plan” promoted by the Bureau,
and the “Pick Plan” promoted by the Corps.92 Ultimately these
competing plans were reconciled in a document known as the PickSloan Plan, which was authorized by Congress in the Flood Control
Act of 1944, at about the same time as Buford Dam.93
The Bureau and the Corps each criticized the other’s plans. The
Bureau was especially critical of the Corps’ economic analysis for its
multipurpose projects—in particular, of its failure to allocate storage
and to conduct a benefit–cost analysis for each purpose.94 This
disagreement is demonstrated by correspondence in which the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation urged the Chief of
Engineers to establish a more precise allocation of storage and costs
for the Pick Plan.95 The Chief of Engineers declined, explaining that
the Army preferred instead to request authorization for multiple
purpose developments in very general terms,96 thus allowing the
Corps to retain maximum flexibility to alter its projects over time.97
The Pick-Sloan correspondence demonstrates that Army policy as it
existed in 1944—just two years before Lake Lanier was authorized—
not only did not require, but actively discouraged the type of detailed
economic analysis that is required today.
The modern project authorization procedures were not adopted as
national policy until 1983, when President Reagan approved the
Economic and Environmental Principles and Guidelines for Water

92. See generally John R. Ferrell, Big Dam Era 39–68 (1993).
93. Pub. L. No. 78-534 § 9, 58 Stat. 887, 891–92 (1944) (codified in scattered sections of 16, 33 &
43 U.S.C.); Ferrell, supra note 92, at 65.
94. See H.R. Doc. No. 78-475, at 5–9 (1944) (printing a letter from H.W. Bashore, Commissioner,
Bureau of Reclamation, to Major Gen. E. Reybold, Chief of Engineers, War Department); id. at 3
(printing a letter from Major Gen. E. Reybold, Chief of Engineers, War Department, to Chairman,
Committee on Flood Control, U.S. House of Representatives).
95. See id. at 5–9.
96. See id. at 3.
97. See id. at 4.
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and Related Land Resources Implementation Studies (P&G).98 The
P&G establish detailed guidelines for the survey reports submitted to
Congress in support of authorization requests. For example, they
require that the federal objective for any proposed project “be stated
in terms of an expressed desire to alleviate problems and realize
opportunities,” and that “[e]ach statement of a problem or
opportunity should be expressed in terms of a desired output,” such
as “[r]educ[ing] flood losses in the Red River floodplain . . . .”99
Given the emphasis on economic efficiency, the P&G further require
that a detailed benefit–cost analysis be prepared for each project
purpose to ensure that it is included at the optimal level to maximize
national economic development.100 When a survey report is prepared
in accordance with these guidelines, there is rarely any doubt about
the purposes for which authorization is requested.
It is precisely this type of analysis the Corps was looking for, but
did not find, when it reviewed the Chief of Engineers’ report for
Lake Lanier. The Corps’ logical error was to conclude that the
absence of a P&G-style analysis for the water supply purpose meant
that water supply was never intended to be an authorized purpose of
Lake Lanier—when in fact, as confirmed by the Pick-Sloan
correspondence, there was simply no expectation at the time that
such an analysis would be done for each authorized purpose.
The type of analysis the Corps expected to find in the documents
for Lake Lanier was not required until December 31, 1952, when the
Bureau of the Budget issued a directive to all executive agencies
known as Budget Circular A-47.101 Among other requirements, the

98. U.S. Water Res. Council, Economic and Environmental Principles and Guidelines for Water and
Related Land Resources Implementation Studies (1983), available at http://planning.usace.army.mil/
toolbox/library/Guidance/Principles_Guidelines.pdf.
99. Id. at 1.
100. Id. at 7.
101. Budget Circular A-47 from Frederick J. Lawton, Dir., Bureau of the Budget to the Heads of
Exec. Dep’ts & Establishments (Dec. 31, 1952) (on file with the Georgia State University Law Review)
[hereinafter Budget Circular A-47]; see also Maynard M. Hufschmidt, Benefit-Cost Analysis: 19331985, OPEN SIUC 43, available at http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1196&context
=jcwre (last visited Apr. 15, 2013). The Bureau of the Budget was reorganized into the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) in 1970. Exec. Order No. 11,541, 35 Fed. Reg. 10,737 (July 1, 1970).
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circular required the following to be included in all survey reports
requesting authorization:
A concise but complete estimate of all the benefits and all of the
economic costs of undertaking the program or project. In
addition to comparing the total benefits of the program or project
with its total economic costs, the estimate should also show
separately the particular benefits and economic costs attributable
to each purpose of the program or project. Wherever appropriate,
benefits and economic costs shall be expressed in monetary
terms. Where monetary estimates cannot reasonably be made,
the relative significance of such benefits and costs shall be stated
102
in as precise and quantitative terms as possible.

The Circular further stated: “Inclusion in a multiple-purpose
program or project plan of any purpose of resource development will,
except in unusual cases . . . , be considered only if the benefits
attributable to that particular purpose are greater than the economic
costs of including that purpose in the program or project.”103 This
was new because the previous policy established by the Flood
Control Act of 1936 was merely to ensure that benefits exceeded
costs overall.104
Budget Circular A-47 was never fully implemented, and the basic
planning framework underwent several revisions before the current
P&G were finally adopted in 1983.105 It is important, though, because
102. Budget Circular A-47, supra note 101, at 5–6.
103. Id. at 6.
104. Pub. L. No. 74-738, § 1, 49 Stat. 1570 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 701a–f).
105. See generally U.S. Water Res. Council, supra note 98, at 1, 7. For an outline of major changes to
the planning framework from 1953 to 1983, see Kyna Powers, Cong. Res. Serv., RL31976, Benefit-Cost
Analysis and the Discount Rate for the Corps of Engineers’ Water Resource Projects: Theory and
Practice (2003). The latest evolution is the result of Section 2031 of the Water Resources Development
Act of 2007, 42 U.S.C. § 1962-3, which instructed the Secretary of the Army to revise the 1983 P&G.
The Secretary released the new “Principles and Requirements” in March 2013, together with proposed
implementing regulations referred to as the “Interagency Guidelines.” See Council on Envtl. Quality,
Principles and Requirements for Federal Investments in Water Resources (March 2013), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/final_principles_and_requirements_march_2013.pdf.
These new Principles and Requirements will not take effect until 180 days after the Interagency
Guidelines are published in final form. It is unclear when this will occur because the Secretary is
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it marks the earliest point in time that a Chief of Engineers’ report
can be expected to have a detailed benefit–cost analysis for each
proposed project purpose. The lesson from Lake Lanier is that
extreme caution must be used when interpreting survey reports
written before 1953—or, more generally, before the existing
guidelines were adopted.
IV. A FRESH LOOK AT OLD REPORTS: READING PROJECT DOCUMENTS
THROUGH AN APPROPRIATE HISTORICAL LENS
A completely different picture of the Chief of Engineers’ report for
Lake Lanier emerges when it is read on its own terms, through the
lens of the policies in effect at the time it was written. At that time,
all that was required of the benefit–cost analysis was a demonstration
that overall benefits exceeded overall costs.106 Because the benefit–
cost ratio for Buford Dam was already greater than one, even without
water supply,107 there was no need to quantify the water supply
benefit before requesting authorization. In reviewing the 1946 report,
therefore, the appropriate question to ask is whether it is clear—
notwithstanding the fact that water supply benefits were not
quantified—that one purpose of the project was to supply water to
Metropolitan Atlanta. When viewed in this light, it is hard to escape
the conclusion that providing water to Atlanta was not just a purpose,
but indeed one of the main reasons that Buford Dam was built.
The Chief of Engineers’ Report of May 13, 1946108 recommended
the approval of a plan prepared by the Commander of the South
Atlantic Division.109 In summarizing this recommendation, the Chief
of Engineers specifically noted that “the city of Atlanta and local
currently prohibited from spending any funds to develop or implement the Interagency Guidance. See
H.R. Rep. No. 112-331, at 802 (2011) (Conf. Rep.). This budget rider was extended under Section
1101(a)(1) of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act enacted on March 26, 2013.
See Pub. L. No. 113-6 (Mar. 26, 2013).
106. See Flood Control Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-738, § 1, 49 Stat. 1570 (codified at 33 U.S.C.
§ 701a–f).
107. See H.R. Doc. No. 80-300, at v–vi (printing letter from L.C. Martin, Assistant Director of
Estimates, Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the Budget, to the Secretary of War).
108. See id. at 1.
109. See id. ¶ 16, at 7.
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interests” urged construction of Buford Dam to meet a “threatened
shortage of water.”110 He also noted that flow regulation provided by
the Buford Project would “assure an adequate supply of water for
municipal and industrial purposes in the Atlanta metropolitan
area.”111
General Newman went even further in his own report, which the
Chief of Engineers approved and submitted to Congress along with
his own. The Newman Report estimated that Atlanta’s “present
needs” could be met by providing a minimum continuous flow of
about 600 cfs, but that “[t]his minimum release may have to be
increased somewhat as the area develops.”112 General Newman
expressly recognized that providing additional water to Atlanta for
water supply would decrease the amount of hydropower the Corps’
dams could produce. He concluded, however, that any impacts to
hydropower resulting from such an increase would be acceptable
because the change in operations would not “materially reduce”
power benefits downstream, and also because the benefits of
providing water supply to Atlanta would “outweigh any slight
decrease in system power value.”113 When presented this with
language, the Eleventh Circuit had no difficulty concluding that
water supply is and always has been an “authorized purpose” of
Buford Dam.114
V. THE PROPER ROLE (OR NOT) OF POST-AUTHORIZATION
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND APPROPRIATIONS LEGISLATION IN
CONSTRUING AUTHORIZING LEGISLATION
The Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that Congress intended for Lake
Lanier to meet Atlanta’s water supply needs is consistent with the
Corps’ contemporaneous statements concerning its authorization, as
110. Id. ¶ 9, at 4.
111. Id. ¶ 11(d), at 5 (emphasis added).
112. Id. ¶ 80, at 34 (emphasis added).
113. H.R. Doc. No. 80-300 ¶ 80, at 34.
114. In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160, 1187 (11th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 25 (2012).
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well as certain more significant later pronouncements of the Corps.
For example, the Corps issued a “Definite Project Report” shortly
after authorization of the project, which clearly stated that one of “the
primary purposes of the Buford project” was “an increased water
supply for Atlanta.”115 Even the bronze memorial tablet on the face
of Buford Dam identifies water supply as one of the “primary
purposes” of the project.116 More recently, the Corps produced a
report to Congress stating that water supply is an authorized purpose
under the River and Harbor Act of 1946,117 and this finding is
codified in the Corps’ regulations.118
However, none of these subsequent pronouncements factored into
the Eleventh Circuit’s decision. Rather, the Eleventh Circuit based its
conclusion that water supply is an authorized purpose of Lake Lanier
on the authorizing legislation and the incorporated project documents
alone.119 This is as it should be. The scope of Congress’s
authorization was fixed by the authorizing legislation itself. Later
statements by the Corps or even subsequent Congresses, absent
express repeal or alteration, cannot change what was authorized in
the River and Harbor Act of 1946, and they offer little if any
guidance into the authorizing Congress’s intent.120
115. Id. at 1169 (citing U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs: Mobile District, Definite Project Report on
Buford Dam Chattahoochee River, Georgia ¶ 48 (1949)).
116. Photograph of Memorial Tablet, Buford Dam (“FOR PURPOSES OF FLOOD CONTROL—
NAVIGATION—POWER—RECREATION AND WATER SUPPLY.”) (on file with the Georgia State
University Law Review).
117. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, supra note 17, at E-94. This report was submitted to Congress in
response to a congressional mandate in the Water Resources Development Act of 1990, which required
the Corps to identify the authorized purposes for each of its projects. See id. at 1.
118. See 33 C.F.R. § 222.5 app. E (2013) (identifying “Municipal and/or Industrial Water/Supply” as
an authorized purpose of Buford Dam and Lake Lanier).
119. See In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d at 1186–92.
120. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159,
170 (2001) (“[S]ubsequent history is less illuminating than the contemporaneous evidence . . . .”
(quoting Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 420 (1994))); Blanchette v. Conn. Gen. Ins. Corps., 419 U.S.
102, 132 (1974) (“But post-passage remarks of legislators, however explicit, cannot serve to change the
legislative intent of Congress expressed before the Act’s passage. Such statements ‘represent only the
personal views of these legislators, since the statements were (made) after passage of the act.’” (citations
omitted)); Nat’l Woodwork Mfrs. Ass’n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 639 n.34 (1967) (“[T]hese statements
could represent only the personal views of these legislators, since the statements were inserted in the
Congressional Record after passage of the Act.”); United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330
U.S. 258, 282 (1947) (“We fail to see how the remarks of these Senators in 1943 can serve to change the
legislative intent of Congress expressed in 1932.”).
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Yet water projects like Lake Lanier and other Corps multipurpose
reservoirs—particularly those authorized during this time period—
are notable in at least two respects. First, they are often massive
developments that are studied, authorized, funded, and constructed
over a long period of time.121 Congressional involvement therefore
extends far beyond the original authorization of a project, and the
Corps is required to return to Congress annually in an effort to secure
funds for the construction of previously authorized projects.122
Second, perhaps as a result of the pervasive congressional
involvement and their potential to confer significant benefits on
particular uses or users, water projects are frequently driven by the
special, and often parochial, interests of particular members of
Congress.123
Together, these two characteristics often lead to efforts by later
Congresses (or more frequently, by specific congresspersons) to
somehow alter the function of an authorized project in a way that
suits their particular interests. Indeed, the Corps is given
extraordinarily broad latitude to develop water projects, which
affords the Corps substantial discretion in the specific design and
operation of its multipurpose reservoirs.124 The members of Congress
121. Lake Lanier, for example, was the culmination of decades of work. The survey report
incorporated into the River and Harbor Act of 1946 was authorized twenty-one years earlier by the
River and Harbor Act of 1925. See H.R. Doc. No. 80-300, at 10. Following its authorization in 1946, it
took ten years of appropriations by Congress and construction work by the Corps before the project was
ultimately completed in 1956.
122. See Maass, supra note 89, at 34 (explaining that funds for navigation and flood control projects
are appropriated annually, and that the “appropriation process is involved in all stages of project
planning[,] [m]oney is appropriated for conducting the preliminary examination, survey, definite project
report, and detailed plans and specifications”).
123. Arthur Maass explains that, as of 1934, the Corps:
was more nearly responsible to individual Members of Congress directly than to
Congress as a whole or to certain congressional committees. Senators and
Representatives, knowing that the projects they sponsored could not as a rule be
undertaken without favorable Engineer survey reports and support from the [Corps] for
congressional authorizations and appropriations, attempted to pressure the executive
agency into approving those projects.
Id. at 63. He goes on to explain that the “history of the development of procedures for planning water
resource projects between 1934 and 1949 is largely the history of attempts to break down this pattern of
direct [Corps] responsibility to the legislature.” Id. at 68.
124. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Ubbelohde, 330 F.3d 1014, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003) (explaining that the
Flood Control Act of 1944, which authorized the Corps’ projects on the Missouri River, grants the
Corps broad discretion to balance among the projects’ various authorized purposes and “does not
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who oversee the authorization and appropriate funds for these
projects are aware of this discretion and the Corps’ need to return for
additional funding to see its projects through to completion. As a
result, they and others in Congress often seek to use the
appropriations process to shape the design and function of projects,
exacting agreements and concessions from the Corps before an
appropriation is made. While these agreements are rarely included as
actual conditions of appropriations legislation, both the Corps and the
appropriators (who have long memories) take them seriously.
Both of these issues are clearly evident in the post-authorization
history of Lake Lanier. As discussed above, budget priorities and
cost–benefit requirements changed over time. These shifting
priorities and policies led the Corps and members of Congress
seeking to secure funding for Lake Lanier to change the way they
described the project in testimony before the appropriations
committees. The focus shifted away from water supply to those
purposes that, at that time, would support an appropriation based on
then-existing budget policy and cost–benefit requirements.125 What is
more, the project, like many others, became part of a larger struggle
regarding the proper role of the federal government in shaping water
policy, federal budget priorities, and the relative role of states and
local governments in constructing and funding water projects for
their benefit. Thus it was that Congressman Gerald Ford, a fiscally
conservative proponent of a more limited federal role and increased
cost-sharing by the beneficiaries of federal projects, focused on the
absence of any monetary contribution by Atlanta toward the project,
and sought concessions from the Corps in an apparent effort to limit
the federal benefit conferred on Atlanta.126
provide is a method of deciding whether the balance actually struck by the Corps in a given case is
correct or not”).
125. See, e.g., Civil Functions, Department of the Army Appropriations, 1954: Hearings on H.R. 5376
Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 83d Cong. 480 (1953) (statement of Colonel
E.C. Paules) (describing the project as “a combination flood control—power project which will assist
navigation downstream by the regulation of the river flows”); Civil Functions, Department of the Army
Appropriations, 1953: Hearings on H.R. 7268 Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Appropriations,
82d Cong. 1196–97 (1952) (statement of Rep. James C. Davis, Georgia) (seeking appropriations and
describing the project as providing flood control, power, and navigation benefits).
126. See Civil Functions, epartment [sic] of the Army Appropriations for 1952: Hearings Before the
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The district court in the Tri-State case relied heavily on this “postauthorization legislative history,” focusing almost exclusively on
statements and reports generated long after the project was
authorized in 1946 to conclude that water supply was not an
authorized purpose.127 For example, the district court found that the
“legislative history of the Buford project . . . consistently described
the primary purposes of the project as flood control, navigation, and
hydropower.”128 But to reach this conclusion, the district court relied
exclusively on statements made in appropriations hearings in 1951,
1953, and 1954, respectively, well after the project was authorized.129
Reliance on post-authorization statements from appropriations
hearings to ascertain the scope of a project’s authorization is
seriously misplaced. First, as discussed above, “subsequent
legislative history is” at best “a hazardous basis for inferring the
intent of an earlier Congress.”130 This becomes particularly true the
farther removed the statements are from the authorization itself.131
Second, because the appropriations process is separate from the
authorization process, appropriations usually do not affect
substantive project authorizations. Indeed, the rules of both the
House and the Senate specifically prohibit the inclusion in an
appropriations bill of any amendment to existing law. These rules
“call[] for previous choice of policy through authorization by law
before any item of appropriations might be included in a general
appropriations bill.”132 As the Supreme Court explained in TVA v.
Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 82d Cong. 118, 121–22 (1951) (statement of Colonel
Potter).
127. See In re Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 639 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1345 (M.D. Fla. 2009), rev’d and
vacated sub nom. In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 25 (2012).
128. Id.
129. See id.
130. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
131. See Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1082 (5th Cir. 1980) (explaining, in a case
involving a committee report issued five years after the relevant legislation, that later statements are of
little if any interpretive value when they are “so distant in time from the enacting Congress that we
cannot accept their remarks as an accurate expression of the earlier Congress’s intent”).
132. See United States ex rel. Chapman v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 345 U.S. 153, 164 n.5 (1953) (citing
S. Doc. No. 239, at 20 (Rule XVI of Senate Manual, 77th Cong.); H.R. Doc. No. 812, at 384 (Rule XXI
of Rules of the House of Representatives, 77th Cong.)).
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Hill, the purpose of this rule is to avoid the situation where “every
appropriations measure would be pregnant with prospects of altering
substantive legislation, repealing by implication any prior statute
which might prohibit the expenditure.”133 This is not to say that
Congress absolutely cannot use appropriations legislation as a vehicle
to change the substantive law, as it has been established that it can,134
but the rule does create a strong presumption against finding that this
has occurred. More generally, it is quite clear that a substantive
authorization cannot, under any circumstances, be modified as a
result of congressional testimony or language included in a
committee report that is not enacted into law.
In the end, as in all cases of statutory interpretation, the question is
Congress’s intent. That intent must be gleaned from the authorizing
legislation and any incorporated reports, read in their historical
context. The focus must be on what Congress understood it was
authorizing, and special care must be taken to avoid being drawn in
by shifting project descriptions and convenient appropriations
testimony occurring long after authorization.
CONCLUSION
The operations of many existing federal water projects need to be
updated to address present and future needs. This need will only
increase as communities grapple with balancing population and
economic growth and environmental health with dwindling water
supplies. To date, however, this has proved difficult and all too often
led to seemingly endless litigation among basin stakeholders.
133. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978).
134. See, e.g., United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 222 (1980) (“Nevertheless, when Congress desires
to suspend or repeal a statute in force, ‘[t]here can be no doubt that . . . it could accomplish its purpose
by an amendment to an appropriation bill, or otherwise.’” (quoting United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S.
554, 555 (1940))); id. (“‘The whole question depends on the intention of Congress as expressed in the
statutes.’” (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 109 U.S. 146, 150 (1883))); Miccosukee Tribe of Indians
of Fla. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 619 F.3d 1289, 1303 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that provision in
omnibus appropriations act repealed National Environmental Policy Act, Endangered Species Act, and
other statutes as they related to Everglades restoration project, and thus deprived federal courts of
jurisdiction to hear tribe’s claims).

Published by Reading Room, 2013

27

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 3

986

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:4

The Tri-State Water Rights Litigation makes clear that the Corps
may be able to modify project operations to meet the needs of the
twenty-first century without additional Congressional authorization.
It teaches us that to fully understand the scope of the Corps’ authority
at a particular project, we must read and understand the authorizing
legislation and survey reports through a historical lens that accounts
for the policies and procedures in place at the time the project was
authorized. And it cautions against the dangers of relying on postauthorization statements to ascertain a project’s authorized purposes.
In the end, the Tri-State Litigation shows that the Corps has much
more authority than it has previously understood or has been willing
to accept. This expansive authority perhaps puts the Army in an
unenviable position, as it will be forced to make incredibly
controversial and consequential decisions. But this is just the natural
consequence of Congress’s broad delegation of authority to the
Corps—to strike the appropriate balance among projects’ various
authorized purposes.
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